"55. The Court reiterates that the concept of a “criminal charge” in Article 6 is an autonomous one. According to its established case-law there are three criteria to be taken into account when deciding whether a person was “charged with a criminal offence” for the purposes of Article 6, namely the classification of the proceedings under national law, their essential nature and the type and severity of the penalty that the applicant risked incurring (see Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, § 31, ECHR 2001-VII and A.P., M.P. and T.P. v. Switzerland, 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, § 39). Moreover, the scope of Article 6 § 2 is not limited to criminal proceedings that are pending (see Allenet de Ribemont v. France, judgment of 10 February 1995, Series A no. 308, § 35). In certain instances, the Court has also found the provision applicable to judicial decisions taken after the discontinuation of such proceedings (see, in particular, Minelli v. Switzerland, 25 March 1983, Series A no. 62, and Lutz, Englert and Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25 August 1987, Series A no. 123), or following an acquittal (see Sekanina v. Austria, 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266-A; Rushiti v. Austria, no. 28389/95, 21 March 2000; and Lamanna v. Austria, no. 28923/95, 10 July 2001). Those judgments concerned proceedings related to such matters as an accused’s obligation to bear court costs and prosecution expenses, a claim for reimbursement of his (or his heirs’) necessary costs, or compensation for pre-trial detention, and which were found to constitute a consequence of, and to be concomitant to criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court will examine whether the compensation proceedings in the present case gave rise to a “criminal charge” against the applicant and, in the event that this was not the case, whether the compensation proceedings were, nevertheless, linked to the criminal trial in such a way as to fall within the scope of Article 6 § 2.
56. Turning to the first of the above-mentioned criteria, the classification of the proceedings under national law, the Court notes that the applicant remained “charged”, formally speaking, until his acquittal gained legal force. However, this concerned only the initial criminal charge of which he was acquitted; it was of no relevance to the compensation claim. The Court notes that the latter had its legal basis in the general principles of the national law on torts applicable to personal injuries. According to the aforementioned principles, criminal liability is not a prerequisite for liability to pay compensation. Even where, as in the present case, the victim had opted to join a compensation claim to the criminal trial, the claim would still be considered a “civil” one. This is also apparent from the domestic courts’ judgments in the applicant’s case, which described the claim as “civil”. Thus, the Court finds that the compensation claim at issue was not considered to be a “criminal charge” under the relevant national law.
57. As regards the second and third criteria, the nature of the proceedings and the type and severity of the “penalty” (namely, in the instant case, the allegedly punitive award of compensation), the Court observes that, while the conditions for civil liability could in certain respects overlap, depending on the circumstances, with those for criminal liability, the civil claim was nevertheless to be determined on the basis of the principles that were applicable to the civil law of tort. The outcome of the criminal proceedings was not decisive for the compensation case. The victim had a right to claim compensation regardless of whether the defendant had been convicted or, as in the present case, acquitted, and the compensation issue was to be the subject of a separate legal assessment, based on criteria and evidentiary standards which differed in several important respects from those applicable to criminal liability.
58. In the Court’s view, the fact that an act which may give rise to a civil compensation claim under the law of tort is also covered by the objective constitutive elements of a criminal offence cannot, notwithstanding its gravity, provide sufficient grounds for regarding the person allegedly responsible for the act in the context of a tort case as being “charged with a criminal offence”. Nor can the fact that evidence from the criminal trial has been used to determine the civil law consequences of that act warrant such a characterisation. Otherwise, Article 6 § 2 would give a criminal acquittal the undesirable effect of pre-empting the victim’s possibilities for claiming compensation under the civil law of tort, thereby constituting an arbitrary and disproportionate limitation on his or her right of access to court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. This again could give an acquitted defendant, who is deemed responsible according to the civil burden of proof, the undue advantage of avoiding any responsibility for his or her actions. Such an extensive interpretation would not be supported either by the wording of Article 6 § 2, or by any common ground in the national legal systems within the Convention community. On the contrary, in a significant number of Contracting States, an acquittal does not preclude the establishment of civil liability in relation to the same facts (see Y. v. Norway, no. 56568/00, § 41, 11 February 2003).

59. Thus, the Court considers that, while the acquittal from criminal liability ought to be maintained in the compensation proceedings, it should not preclude the establishment of civil liability to pay compensation arising out of the same facts on the basis of a less strict burden of proof (see, mutatis mutandis, X v. Austria, no. 9295/81, Commission decision of 6 October 1992, Decisions and Reports (D.R.) 30, and M.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11882/85, decision of 7 October 1987, D.R. 54).
60. However, if the national decision on compensation contains a statement imputing criminal liability to the respondent party, this could raise an issue falling within the ambit of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see Y. v. Norway, § 42, cited above).
61. The Court will therefore examine the question whether the domestic courts acted in such a way or used such language in their reasoning as to create a clear link between the criminal case and the ensuing compensation proceedings and to justify extending the scope of the application of Article 6 § 2 to the latter.
62. The Court notes that the Suceava Court of Appeal concluded its judgment with the following finding:
“For the above-mentioned reasons, [the court] considers that the applicant is guilty of the offence for which he was correctly indicted and his case sent for trial, the fact that the [lower] courts have acquitted him on the basis of the provisions of Article 47 of the [Romanian] Criminal Code (which is not applicable), is irrelevant in respect of the civil limb.”

63. That judgment was final, was delivered in the applicant’s absence and was not subject to appeal. Although the operative part of the judgment upheld the decisions of the lower courts in acquitting the applicant in respect of the criminal limb of the proceedings, the Court reiterates that, the reasoning in a judgment has the same binding effect as the operative part, if like in the present case, it forms its essential underpinning (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 25, in fine, ECHR 2004-I). Consequently, the operative part of the judgment did not rectify the issue, which in the Court’s opinion, thereby remained.
64. The Court observes that the Court of Appeal took note of the fact that the applicant had been acquitted of the criminal charges by the lower courts, and that it upheld their judgments. However, in seeking to protect the legitimate interests of the purported victim, the Court of Appeal expressly declared the applicant “guilty of the offence for which he was correctly indicted”. Consequently, the Court considers that the language employed by the Suceava Court of Appeal, overstepped the bounds of the civil forum, thereby casting doubt on the correctness of that acquittal. Accordingly, there was a sufficient link to the criminal proceedings which was incompatible with the presumption of innocence.
65. In the light of all the above considerations, the Court finds that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention was applicable to the proceedings relating to the compensation claim. Therefore, it dismisses the Government’s objection and concludes that that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.
66. Having regard to its finding in respect of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (above), the Court considers that it has examined the outstanding legal issue raised by the present application. Therefore, it does not consider it necessary to give a separate ruling on the remaining allegations of violations of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Uzun v. Turkey, no. 37410/97, § 64, 10 May 2007; Amanalachioai v. Romania, no. 4023/04, § 63, 26 May 2009; Fikret Çetin v. Turkey, no. 24829/03, § 44, 13 October 2009; and Efendioğlu v. Turkey, no. 3869/04, § 35, 27 October 2009)."